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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 





S. CHARLES KELLY, 
 




BOEING, INC., also known as BOEING HELICOPTER 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-02152) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on July 12, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 4, 2013) 
 
                            
 
O P I N I O N 
                            
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 S. Charles Kelly appeals from the District Court’s August 11, 2011 order.  For the 




 In May 2009, Kelly filed a complaint against Boeing, Inc., alleging race 
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.  
§ 2000e et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat.  
§ 951 et seq.  The parties attempted to settle the case, and in January 2011, they 
unsuccessfully mediated before retired Magistrate Judge Diane M. Welsh.  On February 
1, 2011, Kelly called Ronald Surkin, his counsel at the time, to discuss again the 
possibility of settlement.  After speaking for 30-45 minutes, Kelly authorized Surkin to 
settle the matter for $225,000.  That same day, Surkin conveyed the offer to Boeing via 
Magistrate Judge Welsh, and Boeing accepted by email.  Boeing attached to the email a 
written settlement agreement incorporating the agreed-upon terms, but Kelly refused to 
sign it.   
 On February 14, 2011, Boeing filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.  
Surkin responded and requested that the District Court place a charging lien on the 
settlement proceeds in the amount of his attorney’s fees and costs.  Kelly disagreed that 
the settlement was a valid agreement and filed a letter in opposition to Boeing’s motion.  
On March 10, 2011, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing, at which Surkin and 
Kelly testified.  In a Memorandum and Order dated May 26, 2011, the District Court 
granted Boeing’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement, applied a charging lien in 
favor of Surkin’s firm, and dismissed the action with prejudice.  On August 11, 2011, the 
District Court clarified its May 26, 2011 order and granted Surkin’s motion to compel 
compliance with it.   
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On September 12, 2011, Kelly appealed.   
II. Discussion 
 A. Jurisdiction 
 Boeing contends that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely because it was 
filed more than thirty days after the May 26, 2011 order, which dismissed the action with 
prejudice.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (requiring notice of appeal in civil case to be 
filed within 30 days of entry of order or judgment being appealed); see also Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-10 (2007) (holding 30-day limit to be mandatory and 
jurisdictional).  It is undisputed, however, that Kelly timely appealed the August 11, 2011 
order, which stated:   
The May 26, 2011 order and accompanying memorandum are clarified as follows.  
All terms of the agreement are enforceable without plaintiff’s signature.  
Accordingly, defendant Boeing is directed to make payment to Gallagher, 
Schoenfield, Surkin, Chupein & DeMis, P.C. in the amount of $85,336.39 in 
accordance with the charging lien placed on the settlement amount.   
 
Because the August 11, 2011 order resolved a minor, but nonetheless substantive, 
ambiguity in the original judgment, the 30-day time period in which to appeal began 
anew.  See F.T.C. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 211-12 (1952) 
(explaining that an order that substantively changes, or resolves a genuine ambiguity in, a 
judgment previously rendered begins anew the time period for appeal); Keith v. Truck 
Stops Corp. of Am., 909 F.2d 743, 746 (3d Cir. 1990) (“An order substantively changing 
a judgment constitutes a new judgment with its own time for appeal at least where the 
change is the subject matter to be reviewed.”).  We thus have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  § 1331.    
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   B. Settlement Agreement 
 Kelly argues that the settlement agreement is not enforceable because he neither 
had the capacity to enter into it nor authorized Surkin to do so.  Where, as here, there has 
been an evidentiary hearing and explicit findings of fact have been made, we review the 
District Court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement for clear error.  See Tiernan v. 
Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991).  A settlement agreement is binding once 
the parties express mutual assent to its terms and conditions, see Main Line Theatres, Inc. 
v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 298 F.2d 801, 802 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1962), and need not 
be reduced to writing to be enforceable.  See Green v. John H. Lewis & Co., 436 F.2d 
389, 390 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam).   
 Kelly first contends that he did not have the capacity to enter into a settlement 
agreement because he was confused as a result of his diabetes medication.  Based on the 
testimony introduced at the evidentiary hearing, the District Court rejected Kelly’s claim, 
noting that Kelly initiated the call to Surkin, never indicated during the 30-45 minute 
discussion that he felt unwell, and did not appear to Surkin to be impaired or unable to 
understand the conversation.  The District Court did not err in finding that Kelly had the 
capacity to enter into the settlement.  See Sobel v. Sobel, 254 A.2d 649, 651 (Pa. 1969) 
(explaining that a person’s mental capacity is best determined by his spoken words and 
his conduct, as well as the testimony of persons who observed such conduct on that date).         
 Kelly further argues that he did not authorize Surkin to convey the settlement offer 
to Boeing.  As the District Court found, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing clearly 
showed that Kelly expressly authorized Surkin to convey a settlement offer of $225,000 
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to Boeing and that Boeing accepted.  See Covington v. Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 
216, 221 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding attorney must have express authority to settle a client’s 
claims).  Kelly’s subsequent refusal to execute the written agreement memorializing their 
settlement has no bearing on the enforceability of the settlement.  See Green, 436 F.2d at 
390.        
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
